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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
VIDAR KILICER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20050406-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Defendant appeals from an 
untimely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. R.100-01. As explained below, 
the time limit imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) for filing a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is "a constitutionally permissible jurisdictional bar." State 
v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, If 48, 114 P.3d 585. Because defendant's motion to 
withdraw was untimely, both the trial court and this Court lack jurisdiction over 
the motion. See id. at ^ 20; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, % 3, 40 P.3d 630 (holding 
that because the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely, 
the Utah Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that it lacked jurisdiction over 
defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
"Jurisdictional questions, such as subject matter jurisdiction, are reviewed 
for correctness/7 Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, ^ 10, 534 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
(citing State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10 If 5, 84 P.3d 1193). 
2. Should this Court consider defendant's constitutional challenges to the 
time limit for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the claims are 
unpreserved and defendant does not argue that any exception to the 
preservation rule applies? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
3. Even if defendant's constitutional claims were preserved, are the claims 
ripe for adjudication? 
Because his claims were not raised below, no standard of review applies to 
this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of the following statute and 
rule: 
§ 77-13-6. Withdrawal of Plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
2 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a 
plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is 
announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is 
denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea 
shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, 
Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 77-13-6 (West 2004). 
Rule 65C Post-conviction relief. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at 
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where 
the petitioner is confined. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant is a Turkish national who was granted lawful permanent 
resident status in 2004. R.71. On 21 July 2004 the State charged defendant with 
one count of theft, a first degree felony. R.l-2. Following plea negotiations, the 
State filed an amended information charging one count each of theft and 
burglary, both third degree felonies. R.38-40. On 19 November 2004 defendant 
pled guilty to both counts in the amended information and the State agreed not 
3 
to oppose a reduction in the degree of the offenses if defendant successfully 
completed probation. R.47-54. On 4 March 2005 the trial court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory prison terms for his convictions, but suspended those 
sentences and placed defendant on probation on several conditions, including 
that he serve 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. R.62-65. 
On 8 April 2005 defendant, through new counsel, filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. R.71-82, 98-99 (a copy of defendant's motion and 
supporting memorandum are attached as Addendum B). He claimed that his 
plea was invalid because his prior counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
misrepresenting the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas. R.71-82, 98. 
Defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6, 
which requires a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to be made before sentence is 
announced. R.71-82. 
The district court denied defendant's motion to withdraw as untimely. 
R.100-01 (a copy of the district court's order is attached as Addendum A). The 
district court ruled that because his motion to withdraw was untimely, 
"[defendant's only remedy lies under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." R.101. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant admitted to Murray City Police Detective Bass that he planned 
and participated in a 27 May 2004 Pizza Hut robbery. R.3. Defendant explained 
that the evening before the robbery, he and two friends, Christopher Bradford 
and Brian Wheeler, made plans to rob the Pizza Hut where Bradford worked as a 
manager. R.2-3. The next evening, defendant and Wheeler drove Bradford to 
work and then parked in a field. R.3. As Bradford later exited the building with 
the night deposit, Wheeler confronted him with a BB gun and demanded the 
money. R.2-3. Wheeler fled to defendant's vehicle with $1,058.62. R3. The three 
later met and divided the money. R.3. 
At the plea hearing, defendant admitted to driving the getaway car. R.48, 
112:3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Both the trial court and this Court lack jurisdiction over this appeal. 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was untimely. The law is well-
settled that the time limit on motions to withdraw is jurisdictional. 
II. This Court should not consider defendant's constitutional challenges to 
the time limit on motions to withdraw because the claims are unpreserved and 
1
 Because defendant pled guilty, these facts are taken from the probable 
cause statement in the information and the record of defendant's guilty plea 
hearing. 
5 
defendant does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule should 
apply. Defendant's mention of the "plain error" and "exceptional 
circumstances" exceptions in the "statement of the issues" portion of his brief is 
inadequate to justify consideration of his unpreserved claims. 
III. In any event, defendant's constitutional claims are not ripe because he 
has not show that he can not challenge his guilty plea under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act (PCRA). Defendant claims that an action under the PCRA would 
be unavailable because he cannot satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 
65C(k). However, it is not clear that Rule 65C(k) would prevent petitioner from 
proceeding under the PCRA. Defendant also claims that the PCRA's remedy is 
inadequate because a collateral challenge to his convictions under the PCRA will 
not stay his deportation proceedings, but a direct challenge via a motion to 
withdraw will. Defendant is incorrect. Neither type of challenge will stay his 
deportation proceedings. Therefore, defendant suffers no disadvantage by 
proceeding under the PCRA. 
Even if defendant were correct that the PCRA's remedy was somehow 
unavailable or inadequate, it is federal law, not state law, that produces this 
result. Therefore, defendant's remedy lies in federal, rather than state court. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
WAS UNTIMELY 
" A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. . . shall be made by 
motion before sentence is announced." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (West 
2004). This time limit is jurisdictional. State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, f 20,114 P.3d 
585. Consequently, failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea" in 
both the trial and appellate courts. Id. at % 17 (quoting State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 
t 3,40 P.3d 630, which relied on State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely and 
therefore both the trial court and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider the 
motion. Defendant pled guilty on 19 November 2004. R.47-57. He was 
sentenced on 4 March 2005. R.62-65. He did not file his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea until 8 April 2005, more than a month after sentencing. R.98. Because 
section 77-13-6(2)(b) required defendant to file his motion before sentence was 
announced, the motion was untimely. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b). 
Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
untimely motion. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at \ 20. 
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Defendant's failure to file a timely motion to withdraw also deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction to consider his motion. See id. "[T]he jurisdictional 
implications of section 77-13-6(2)(b) are independent of the court whose 
jurisdiction the defendant seeks to invoke/' Id. Because this Court also lacks 
jurisdiction over this appeal, it "retains only the authority to dismiss the action." 
See Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230,1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY ARE 
UNPRESERVED AN HE ARGUES NO EXCEPTION TO THE 
PRESERVATION RULE 
Defendant argues that the time limit in section 77-13-6 denies him due 
process and equal protection because it forecloses him from ever being able to 
challenge the validity of his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 12-25. This Court should not 
consider defendant's constitutional challenges because they are unpreserved and 
defendant does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies. 
Defendant's constitutional claims are unpreserved because he did not raise 
them in the trial court. R.71-82, 98-99. "An issue is properly raised in the trial 
court if: (1) the issue is raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue is specifically 
raised; and (3) the issue is supported by evidence or relevant legal authority/' 
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, \ 56, 102 P.3d 774 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). 
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Defendant does not satisfy any of these criteria. First, as discussed above, 
the motion to withdraw was untimely. Second, defendant did not specifically 
raise his constitutional claims because his motion and supporting memorandum 
do not mention those claims. R.71-85, 98-99 (Add. B). Rather, defendant ignored 
the untimeliness of his motion and merely argued that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea because of his prior counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. 
R.71-82, 98-99. Third, defendant did not provide the trial court with any 
authority to support the constitutional claims that he now asserts. In his motion 
to withdraw, defendant did not cite to the federal or state constitution, or any 
case law interpreting the constitutional provisions that he now claims were 
violated. Nor did he analyze how the time limit ostensibly violated his 
constitutional rights. R.71-85, 98-99. 
Defendant asserts that he preserved his claims below by stating in a 
footnote in his supporting memorandum that "[tjhis case crystal[l]izes the 
dilemma of a criminal defendant attempting to withdraw a guilty plea, but who 
was unaware of counsel's ineffectiveness prior to sentencing and entering of 
judgment/ ' Aplt. Br. at 2 (citing to R.73 n.2). This is insufficient to raise his 
current constitutional claims with specificity or sufficient authority. The footnote 
does not even assert that defendant's alleged dilemma violates his constitutional 
rights, let alone analyze how it does so. Moreover, as the district court noted, 
9 
section 77-13-6 resolves defendant's apparent dilemma because it allows 
individuals in defendant's situation to pursue their ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims under the PCRA. R.101 (Add. A), UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-
6(2)(c). Neither defendant's footnote, nor anything else in his motion, argued 
that section 77-13-6 violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, he failed to 
properly raise his constitutional claims below. 
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, If 13, 95 P.3d 276 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 
P.3d 346). A party seeking review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the 
justification for review in the party's opening brief." State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, 
f 45, 114 P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, If 9, 17 P.3d 1122). 
When a party fails to do so, an appellate court may refuse to consider the 
unpreserved issue. Id. at f f 50, 58 (refusing to consider Pinder's unpreserved 
claims because he "failed to argue plain error or show exceptional circumstances 
on appeal"). 
This Court should not consider defendant's unpreserved claims because he 
fails to argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies. In the 
"question presented" section of his brief, defendant does mention that "[i]n the 
10 
alternative, this Court should apply the 'plain error' or exceptional 
circumstances7 doctrine to [the] failure to preserve the issues/' Aplt. Br. at 2. 
However, defendant never analyzes how those doctrines might apply to this 
case. In fact, he does not even mention those doctrines in the argument portion 
of his brief. Therefore, defendant's claims are inadequately briefed and this 
Court should decline to address them. See State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 452, f 6 
n.2 (unpublished memorandum decision) ("Defendant mentions plain error in a 
single paragraph, but fails to apply plain error doctrine to any of the specific 
issues raised. Thus, we do not address Defendant's plain error argument 
because it is inadequately briefed") (a copy of this unpublished decision is 
attached as Addendum C). 
III. DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE NOT 
RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION BECAUSE HE HAS NOT 
SHOWN THAT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS 
UNAVAILABLE OR INADEQUATE; EVEN IF HE COULD 
MAKE SUCH A SHOWING, DEFENDANT'S REMEDY LIES 
IN FEDERAL, NOT STATE COURT 
A. Defendant's claims are not ripe. 
Even if defendant had preserved his claims, or argued that an exception to 
the preservation rule applied, this Court should not consider them because they 
are not ripe for adjudication. 
Defendant claims that the time limit in section 77-13-6 violates his due 
process and equal protection rights. Aplt. Br. at 8. However, the Utah Supreme 
11 
Court recently rejected a similar challenge in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, % 48,114 
P.3d 585. Merrill held that the former thirty-day time limit in section 77-13-6 
"creates a constitutionally permissible jurisdictional bar" that did not violate due 
process or equal protection. Id. at ^ 30, 47-48. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court noted that under section 77-13-6, a defendant who misses the deadline 
could still challenge his guilty plea under the PCRA. The court reasoned that 
"[t]his statutory scheme satisfies the demands of due process," and also resolves 
any equal protection concerns because it "is adequate to justify the disparate 
treatment of defendants [who miss the statutory deadline]." Merrill, 2005 UT 34 
at TfIf 30, 45. In short, the Utah Supreme Court found that the deadline in section 
77-13-6 was constitutional because the PCRA provided a second chance for any 
defendant who missed the deadline. Id. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Merrill by arguing that he cannot 
challenge his guilty pleas under the PCRA because it is impossible for him to 
comply with the PCRA's procedural requirement to be present for dispositive 
hearings. Aplt. Br. at 14,18, 22, 24-25. Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
governs PCRA actions. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). Subsection (k) of that rule states 
that "[t]he petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive 
issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C(k). Defendant argues that he cannot comply with this rule, and 
12 
therefore cannot seek relief under the PCRA, because, as an inmate in the 
custody of federal immigration officials in Arizona, he is unable to be physically 
present for any post-conviction hearing in state court. Aplt. Br. at 14,18, 22, 24-
25. Because he claims that he cannot proceed under the PCRA, defendant 
reasons that the jurisdictional time limit on his motion to withdraw is 
unconstitutional because it deprives him of any forum in which to challenge his 
guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 12-25. However, this claim is not ripe because defendant 
has not even attempted, let alone been denied the opportunity, to seek relief 
under the PCRA based on Rule 65C(k). Nor does it appear that he would be. 
A claim is not ripe when the "controversy . . . has not yet sharpened into 
an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties 
thereto." Herrera v. Sweezey, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme 
Court further explained that "[w]ere there exists no more than a difference of 
opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of legislation to a 
situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the 
question is unripe for adjudication." Id. 
At this point, defendant's claim that he could not proceed under the PCRA 
is based entirely on a hypothetical application of Rule 65C(k). Defendant has not 
yet sought post-conviction relief. Therefore, he has not been denied the 
opportunity to proceed based on his alleged inability to be physically present. 
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Moreover, it does not appear that Rule 65C(k) would actually prevent a 
petitioner from seeking relief under the PCRA simply because he could not be 
physically present for a dispositive hearing. A reasonable interpretation of this 
rule is that it is intended to protect a petitioner's right to be present, and 
therefore a petitioner could waive the requirement. Furthermore, defendant cites 
no precedent establishing that a post-conviction petitioner cannot proceed 
without being physically present in court, nor is the State aware of any such 
precedent. 
Even if the rule protects more than just a petitioner's right to be present, 
the State has no objection to allowing defendant to proceed under the PCRA 
without being physically present for any dispositive hearing. Given defendant's 
unique circumstance, the State would be willing to allow him to appear and 
testify at any dispositive post-conviction hearing by means of video conference 
or telephone. In fact, the State has agreed to allow other post-conviction 
petitioners in similar circumstances to appear and testify by telephone. The State 
has attached the dockets from these cases as Addenda D, E, & F.2 Therefore, 
2
 These dockets do not appear in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, the 
Court may take judicial notice that the petitioners in each case appeared and 
testified by telephone, as stated in the dockets. See Utah R. Evid 201(b) & (f) 
(stating that "a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is . . . (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" and also that 
"[j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding"); Carter v. Carter, 
14 
Rule 65C(k)'s procedural requirement that a post-conviction petitioner be present 
would not prevent defendant from proceeding under the PCRA. 
removal proceedings, but a direct attack via a motion to withdraw will. Aplt. Br. 
at 23-24. Defendant is incorrect. Federal immigration law no longer 
distinguishes between a direct and a collateral attack; neither type of attack VN m 
Once ai i aliei i 1 las beei t coi i;v icted in stai e co i ill: of a deportable offense 
federal immigration officials can deport that alien regardless of whether he is 
directly or collaterally challenging his conviction. "Any alien A* ho is convicted of 
an aggravated felony at any time after admission i- deportable. 
. or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.'" c 
U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(F) & (G). An alien is "convicted" when, "(i) a judge or ju ry 
has found uic «;...!. ^Ui,i\ o; L:^. t.iiwi ;.a> entered a pica V>L viuiiu or nuio 
the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
563 P.2d 177,178 (Utah 1977) ("It is true that notice may be taken of the record of 
another case"). 
15 
alien's liberty to be imposed." 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A)(i) & (ii). In other words, 
an alien is "convicted," and therefore deportable, once his guilt has been 
established by either a guilty plea or trial, and sentence has been imposed. 
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that deportation proceedings need not 
be based on a state conviction that has achieved "finality." See Montenegro v. 
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004). The court explained that prior to 
1996, "the [United States] Supreme Court required that a deportation proceeding 
be based on a conviction that had sufficient 'finality/ . . . which [federal courts] 
interpreted to mean that the alien no longer had any direct appeal pending." Id. 
(internal citations omitted). However, in 1996, Congress amended federal 
immigration law to include the definition of "conviction" cited above. See id. 
Under current law, an alien is "'convicted' once a court enters a formal judgment 
of guilt." Id. Therefore, the 1996 amendments "eliminated the finality 
requirement for a conviction." Id.; see also Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th 
Cir. 1999) ("finality is no longer a requirement"). Defendant's assertion that a 
finality requirement still exists is based on pre-1996 amendment authority. Aplt 
Br. at 23. 
Because federal immigration law no longer requires that a conviction be 
final before an eligible alien can be deported, neither a direct attack on 
defendant's conviction, nor a collateral attack, will stay his deportation 
16 
proceedings. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037; Moosa, 171 R3d at 1009. Therefore, 
defendant suffers no additional disadvantage by having to attack his guilty plea 
under the rLi\A, rather than through a motion to witi a in ftis criminal 
case. • . . ' • 
Defendant has not shown mat the PCRA's remedy is unavailable or 
inadequate to challenge his guilty plea. At best, he merely alleges a hypothetical 
chance that it mk;ht be. Therefore, his constitutional claims are not ripe. See 
Herrera,. isvo i _ j t . i / . / i . 
L 
Even assuming that defendant could show that the PCRA's remedy was 
unavailable or inadequate, he could do so only because he is in federal 
immigration custody undergoing deportation proceedings. Therefore, 
defendant's remedy lies in federal, not state court, provided 
plea under the PCRA. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2) (c); Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at 
Tflf 30, 47-48. The State has done nothing that would prevent defendant from 
pursing that action. Rather, as defendant explains, it is the operation of federal 
law ai id proced (ire tl lilt pre\ ei its 1 till i fron i, beii ig presei it, or fron i obtainii ig a 
I / 
defendant is correct that federal law does prevent him from pursuing an action 
under the PCRA, then his remedy lies in federal, not state court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. / /[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting 
the appellate court in its decision making process/' Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of 
Appeals, 2005 UT 18, Tj 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue 
between the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of CaL, 654 P.2d 
740, 743 (CaL 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be 
significantly aided by oral argument/7 Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Respectfully submitted / o November 2005. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
IN THE THIRD J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• ; r \ ' n P ' M M I J : 
Plaintiff, : MINUTE ENTRY and DECISION 
: DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
vs. : WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS/WRIT OF 
: CORAM NOBIS 
VIDAR KILICER, : 
Defendant. :  Case No.: 041904765 
: Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
I before the court is Defendant's April 8, 2005 motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. On 
November 14, 2004 defendant entered guilty pleas to one count of Burglary, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-202, and to one count of Theft, also a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404. On March 4, 2005 defendant was sentenced to two 
indeterminate terms of 0-5 years at the state prison. That prison term was stayed and Defendant 
was placed on supervised probation through Adult Probation and Parole, subject to his serving 
30 days in jail and completing other conditions of probation. Defendant has now completed his 
30-day jail term but remains incarcerated at the Summit County Jail as a result of a detainer 
lodged by the Department of Homeland Security. Defendant faces removal proceedings as an 
"aggravated felon" as a result of these convictions and is now subject to deportation under 
applicable laws of the United States. Defendant claims that at the time he plead to these crimes, 
he was not aware that the crimes would be grounds for deportation and further that his plea was 
the result of misinformation provided by his counsel at his pleading colloquy. 
f 2 Defendants do not have an unqualified right to withdraw their guilty pleas. Pursuant to 
Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(a), a guilty plea may be withdrawn only upon leave of Court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. More importantly for present purposes, 
under subsection (2)(b) of that section, "[a]request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made 
by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2004) (emphasis added). 
Following pronouncement of sentence, the Court loses jurisdiction to address plea issues except 
for correction of an illegal sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). See, e.g., Utah v. 
Tamawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 2000. The sentence imposed in this case was not 
an illegal sentence subject to correction under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). In fact, Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e) expressly provides that "[ujnless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea." l 
1
 Deportation is a "collateral consequence" of conviction. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 
1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Although an attorney's failure to advise a defendant of the 
possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, id., an affirm ah - -
\ oU 
f3 Defendant's reliance on State v. Rojas-Martinez. 73 P.3d 967, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
is misplaced. In that case, Rojas-Martinez timely filed his motion to withdraw the plea under 
then-existing law. However, in 2004 the Utah legislature amended § 77-13-6 to provide 
expressly that withdrawals of pleas may be made, if at all, only up to the time of sentencing2 
Here, Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was filed more than a month after he was 
sentenced. Under § 77-13-6(2)(c), Defendant's only remedy lies under the Utah Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
f4 Defendant also brings this motion pursuant to a "writ of coram nobis." A writ of coram 
nobis seeks review of a judgment on the ground that judgment would not have been rendered but 
for mistakes of fact which were unknown to the trial court and the parties. State v. Woodward, 
108 Utah 390, 391, 160 P.2d 432, 433 (1945). See also Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85; 448 
P.2d 907 (Utah 1968). Coram nobis is a limited remedy of narrow scope and is available, where 
no other remedy exists, to correct errors of fact, not errors of law. Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 
787 (Utah 1986). As noted in the preceding paragraph, § 77-13-6(2)(c) expressly provides for a 
remedy under Utah law; accordingly, relief by writ of coram nobis is unavailable.3 The motion is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2005. 
Denise Posse LindJ^g^hird District Court Judge 
\ 
misrepresentation of deportation consequences has been found to be ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
2
 Except in pleas in abeyance, not at issue here, in which case a defendant must move to 
withdraw his plea, if at all, within 30 days from the time he pled guilty. 
3
 It is unclear whether Utah law still recognizes the writ of coram nobis. According to Black's 
law dictionary, this writ was abolished by adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and superseded by 
relief provided by that rule. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.).at 304-05. Given that Utah's rules 
of civil procedure, including R. 60(b), are modeled on the federal rules, and that all reported 
Utah cases discussing this writ predate the adoption of the current rules, it may well be that the 
writ is no longer available. 
2
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Addenaum B 
Hakeem Ishola, #5970 
Ishola Law Firm, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
716 East 4500 South, Suite N-142 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 269-9541 
Facsimile: (801) 269-9581 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPT.; 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) EMERGENCY MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEAS/WRIT OF CORAM 
NOBIS 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) Case No. 041904765 
VIDAR KILICER, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) Judge Denis P. Lindberg 
Defendant, by and through counsel, Hakeem Ishola, hereby files this memorandum in 
support of his emergency motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6; 
Rule 11(e)(7), Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant is an 20-year old native and citizen of Turkey, who entered the United States 
with his father at age 8. He attended elementary through high schools in the United States - in 
California, and finally graduated from Cottonwood High School in Salt Lake City, Utah. He is a 
lawful permanent resident alien who acquired that status in 2004 as a ward of the State through 
1 
DCFS, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), after having been found that his parents had 
abandoned him at the lonely age of 12. See Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 
101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Defendant desires to join the United States Marines, as 
he is fluent in Turkish language. 
He was, however, convicted in this court on November 14, 2004, of Burglary, a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, a third degree felony, and Theft, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404, a third degree felony. The convictions entered against him in this Court not only bar 
the application to be filed by his wife, but render Defendant deportable to Turkey as an 
"aggravated felon." See INA §§ 237(a)(2)(a)(iii) & 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
& 1101(a)(43)(G); Matter ofAdetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506(BIA 1992); Jafar v. INS, 11 F.Supp.2d 
360, 364-65 (W.D.N. Y. 1999) (a sentence to one year term of imprisonment for petit larceny, 
while a misdemeanor under state law, is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes). See 
also 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (deportable for having been convicted of two CIMTs). 
This Court sentenced Defendant to 30 days in jail. However, Defendant is currently 
detained in the Summit County Jail because of the detainer lodged by the Department of 
Homeland Security, and is facing removal proceedings as an "aggravated felon" before an 
immigration judge as a result of the convictions. His deportation hearing will shortly be held in 
Denver, Colorado, or Eloy, Arizona. Defendant is also subject to harsh penalties as a felon 
should he re-enter the United States after deportation. See id.; see also INA § 276(b), 8 U.S.C. 
§1326(b). 
Accordingly, there is no question that Defendant faces a real possibility of loss of liberty 
as a result of the conviction. Defendant, however, because of the denial of right to effective 
2 
assistance of counsel, had no idea that he could subsequently be subject to removal as an 
aggravated felon on the basis of this conviction and be precluded from ever becoming a citizen 
or resident alien as a result of the conviction entered in this Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b). 
Therefore, for the reasons stated below, this Court should set a hearing, allow Defendant 
to withdraw his guilty pleas, and then vacate the convictions as a matter of law because 
continuing to have the conviction on his record constitutes wrongful restraint on his personal 
liberty.1 
In the alternative, the Court should vacate nunc pro tunc Defendant's five-year 
suspended jail term, and re-sentence him to 360 days of imprisonment, pursuant to Rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION 
A. This Court has jurisdiction over this motion under Code Ann. § 77-13-6 and 
rules life) and 22(e) 
Section 77-13-6(2)(a), (b), provide that a motion to withdraw guilty plea must be filed 
only upon the leave of the court and within 30 days of entering the plea..2 As amplified below, 
Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as he was not aware of the immigration 
consequences of pleading guilty to the charged crime. More specifically, he was unaware that 
1
 The United States Supreme Court has recognized an expanded definition of restraint or 
custody, noting that a person who is not actually in custody may bring habeas corpus petition for 
unlawful restraint on personal liberty. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348-49 
(1973). Accord Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290 (9th Cir. 1995). 
2
 This case crystalizes the dilemma of a criminal defendant attempting to withdraw a 
guilty plea, but who was unaware of counsel's ineffectiveness prior to sentencing and entering of 
judgment. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(b) (requiring the movant to file a motion to 
withdraw within 30 days of entering plea), with Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (granting right to appeal 30 
days from judgment). 
3 
this offenses for which he was sentenced under state te law could be deemed an "aggravated 
felony" under federal immigration law. Had he been aware that the offenses were indeed an 
aggravated felony, he would have insisted on going to trial with the benefit of counsel. See 
Affidavit of Vidar Kilicer; Addendum II. Further, the recent decision by the Utah court of 
appeals on ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to properly advise an alien of the 
immigration consequence of entering a plea - State v. Rojas-Martinez,3 - applies retrospectively 
in this case pursuant to the long-standing retroactivity principles of the Utah supreme court. 
In the alternative, this Court has jurisdiction over this writ of coram nobis pursuant to 
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 65C of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for the sole purpose of obtaining a new, meaningful sentence in light of the fact that 
the Court and Defendant were under the mistaken impression that he was being sentenced on 
felonies, and not aggravated felonies. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); cf State v. Rees, 63 P.2d 130 
(Utah App. 2003) (holding that a defendant could proceed under the writ of coram nobis to seek 
re-sentencing), cert granted, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003). Pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, a defendant may move to have sentencing reopened to correct any illegality. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Samora, 2001 UT App. 266; see also State v. Rees, supra. 
B. This court should find that Defendant was misadvised of the immigration 
consequences of the plea and, under State v. Rojas-Martinez* substantively allow Defendant 
to withdraw his involuntarily-entered guilty plea because he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches even at a 
guilty plea phase in misdemeanor criminal proceedings, so long as an actual sentence is imposed. 
3
 2003 UT App. 203. 
4 
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). Further, in State v. Rojas-Martinez, P.3d 
, 2003 UT App. 203, 2003 WL 21402759, the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant 
is entitled to sound legal advise regarding the immigration consequences of entering a plea. The 
court held that misinformation by counsel of the immigration consequences of a plea rendered 
counsel constitutionally ineffective. See id Further, "[t]he long-standing traditional rule is that 
the law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and retrospectively, even if the 
decision overrules prior case law." Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 635 (Utah 2001); State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 95 (Utah 1999); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); 
Helsop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992). 
For the reasons stated below, Defendant urges this Court to apply here the new rule 
enunciated in Rojas-Martinez, and find that competent counsel would have correctly advised 
Defendant of the immigration consequences of the plea. Defendant also urges the Court to find 
that but for the denial of the right to effective counsel he would not have pleaded guilty to the 
charged crimes. 
C. Defendant's Plea was involuntary and invalid., and the Convictions Should Be 
Vacated 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. This rule applies even in a misdemeanor proceeding. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. at 373; State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT 
App. 228, 29 P.3d 680. Although this Defendant was represented by counsel during proceedings 
in this Court, he was misadvised of future immigration-related consequences of the conviction. 
It is elementary that a guilty plea entered pursuant to incompetent advise of counsel is 
5 
involuntary and invalid. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Johnson v. 
Atherton, 296 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 2002) ("When an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim implicates the voluntariness of a guilty plea entered into, there is a legitimate constitutional 
claim that may be asserted in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus."); McFadden, 884 P.2d at 
1303; State v. Roj as-Martinez, P.3d , 2003 UTApp. 203, 2003 WL 21402759. Had 
defendant been effectively represented by counsel during proceedings in this Court, he would 
have been told of future immigration-related consequences of the conviction See Rojas-
Martinez. Because Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, his convictions should 
be vacated. 
As a lawful permanent resident alien, Defendant is eligible to become a citizen by filing 
an application for naturalization. See Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 310, 8 U.S.C. § 
1421. However, the theft and burglary convictions entered against him in this Court not only bar 
that application, but render Defendant deportable to Turkey as an "aggravated felon." See INA 
§§ 237(a)(2)(a)(iii) & 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) & 1101(a)(43)(G); Matter of 
Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506(BIA 1992); Jafar v. INS, 77 F.Supp.2d 360, 364-65 (W.D.N.Y. 
1999) (a sentence to one year term of imprisonment for petit larceny, while a misdemeanor under 
state law, is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes); see also Sutherland v. Reno, 228 
F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the statute as very broad, encompassing any crime of 
violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16). Accordingly, Defendant is subject to deportation from 
the United States as a result of the convictions, see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), and is subject to 
other harsh penalties should he illegally re-enter the United States, see INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. 
§1326. 
6 
^7/J 
Thus, there is no question that Defendant faces a real possibility of loss of liberty. 
Defendant, however, had no idea that he could subsequently be subject to removal and be 
precluded from ever becoming a resident alien as a result of the conviction entered in this Court. 
He affirmatively sought advise from counsel and was assured that the conviction posed no dire 
immigration consequences. See Addendum II; but see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Accordingly, failure to correctly advise Defendant of the immigration 
consequences of his guilty right to effective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea 
involuntary. See State v. Rojas-Martinez, supra; State v. Heaton, supra; State v. Petty, supra. 
Had he been represented by effective counsel, Defendant would not have pleaded guilty to the 
offenses. See Affidavit of Vidar Kilicer. See also, e.g.., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322 (stating 
that if a defendant will face deportation as a result of a conviction, he should be fully and 
correctly advised by counsel); Rojas- Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203 (same). 
To further illustrate, on June 28, 2001, the United States Supreme Court rendered a 
decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289, 121 S.Ct. at 2271, in which the Court discussed at 
length the importance of an informed plea discussion between alien criminal defendants, their 
attorneys, and the prosecution.4 The Supreme Court recognized that the nature and timing of plea 
agreements are very critical in determining whether an alien who has committed a crime is 
deported or remains in the United States. See id. 
Defendant believes that the St. Cyr case bolsters his claim that his guilty pleas were 
involuntarily entered because he was misadvised of the immigration consequences of entering the 
4
 See id. at 533 U.S. at 323, n. 48 (chronicling how the States have responded to dealing 
with the criminal aliens and guilty pleas). 
7 
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plea. Had he been fully and correctly apprised of the immigration consequences, Defendant 
would not have entered the plea knowing he would be subject to deportation, notwithstanding 
that he had successfully completed probation. See Defendant's Affidavit, at 2-3. See, e.g., United 
States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Specifically, a plea may be involuntary if the 
attorney materially misinforms the defendant of the consequences of the plea."); State v. 
Martinez, 26 P.3d at 203 (stating that the standard of review for counsel's ineffectiveness in the 
context if a motion to withdraw guilty plea is whether absent the erroneous advise the defendant 
would have proceeded to trial or chose another course); Rojas- Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203 
(same). 
As such, this Court should allow Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas because they 
were involuntarily entered. See Dean, 2002 UT App. 323, 57 P.2d 1106; Rojas- Martinez, 2003 
UT App. 203. 
Further, in INS v. St. Cyr,5 in discussing the importance of guilty pleas with respect to 
alien criminal defendants, the United States Supreme Court finally laid to rest and rejected the 
argument that deportation is "prospective" or "collateral" and, as the argument further goes, 
whether an alien was not advised or misadvised of the immigration consequences of a plea does 
not implicate a guilty plea in a criminal proceeding: 
The INS argues that deportation proceedings (and the Attorney 
General's discretionary power to grant relief from deportation) are 
"inherently prospective" and that, as a result, application of the 
law of deportation can never have a retroactive effect. Such 
5
 For a thorough analysis of the St.Cyr decision, see Ishola, INS v. St. Cyr: The 
Supreme Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-Immigration Laws, 14 Utah Bar 
Journal 9 (Dec. 2001). 
8 
—1 
categorical arguments are not particularly helpful... . 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324, 121 S.Ct. at 2292. The Court then goes on to discuss the 
importance of an effectively-counseled plea agreement between an alien, the defense counsel, 
and the government: 
Plea agreements involved quid pro quo between a criminal 
defendant and the government. See Newton v. Pumery, 480 U.S. 
386,393,n.3, 107 S.Ct. 1187, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987). In exchange 
for perceived benefits, defendants waive several of their 
constitutional rights (including the right to a trial) and grant the 
government numerous "tangible benefits, such as promptly 
imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial 
resources." Id. There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, 
alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea are 
acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their 
convictions. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 612 (9th 
Cir. 1999) ("That an alien charged with a crime . . . would factor 
the immigration consequences of conviction in deciding whether to 
plead or proceed to trial is well-documented."); see also 3 Bender, 
Criminal Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999) 
("Preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may 
be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence."). 
Given the frequency with which § 212©) relief was granted in the 
years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility 
of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought 
by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead 
proceed to trial. 
Id., 533 U.S. at 322-323, 121 S.Ct at 2291. The Supreme Court then reiterates the 
importance of effective assistance of counsel at this stage of criminal proceedings, quoting with 
approval that "if a defendant will face deportation as a result of the conviction defense counsel 
should fully advise the defendant of these consequences." Id. at 323, n.51 {Citing ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, 14-3.2 Comment, 75 (2d ed. 1982)). 
The foregoing lengthy discussion in St. Cyr of the importance of a plea agreement 
-9-
~~**[Oi 
between alien criminal defendants, their attorneys, and the prosecution is a recognition by the 
Court that, with the advent of the new law, the nature and timing of plea agreements become 
highly critical in determining whether an alien who has committed a crime is deported or remains 
in the United States. Indeed, the Court explicitly recognized that deportation under new 
immigration law for a criminal non-citizen is no longer an academic exercise, for "[t]here is a 
clear difference between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation." Id., 533 
U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2293. An alien convicted, as stated above, simply does not face 
deportation; rather, he or she faces, as the Supreme Court held, certain deportation because of the 
irrebutable presumption of deportability. See id; see also Rojas- Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203. 
Accordingly, given the certainty of deportation for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies 
pursuant to IN A § 101(a)(43)(G), the argument that deportation is "collateral" collapses under its 
on its weight, just like the argument that deportation is "inherently prospective" and therefore 
laws eliminating reliefs from deportation can never be retroactive. See St Cyr., 533 U.S. at 324, 
121 S.Ct. 2292. As such, Defendant believes that the Supreme Court in St. Cyr has found 
deportation to be a direct consequence of a criminal conviction, such that a guilty plea becomes 
involuntarily entered when, as here, an alien was denied the right to counsel and was not 
correctly made aware of the immigration consequences of the plea5 See also Rojas-Martinez, 
2003 UT App. 203. Had he been fully and correctly apprised of the immigration consequences, 
Defendant would not have entered the pleas knowing he would automatically be subject to 
deportation and be forever barred from legally becoming a permanent resident. 
6
 Cf. United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2002) (Defendant must 
understand direct consequences of a guilty plea for the plea to be voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent). 
-10-
65(b). In State v. Rees9 the court of appeals held that "under our interpretation of coram nobis, a 
defendant who has been convicted and exhausted his normal avenues of appeal may, under the 
principle of coram nobis, ask the sentencing court to modify or vacate a sentence." 
Here, Defendant was convicted and sentenced without the benefit of an effective counsel. 
He was told he was being sentenced as a simple felon. The convictions and the sentence now 
render him deportable from the United States as an aggravated felon. Accordingly, Defendant's 
sentence should be vacated and he should be re-sentenced nunc pro tunc to a term not to exceed 
360 days. See In re Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2001) (alien does not stand convicted of an 
aggravated felony where the criminal court vacated the 1-year prison sentence of an alien 
convicted of a theft offense and revised the sentence to 360 days in jail). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully asks this Court, as a matter of law, to 
allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas and order his convictions vacated. In the alternative, 
Defendant moves the Court to vacate his five-year suspended sentence and revise such nunc pro 
tunc to a term of 360 days suspended sentence. 
RESPECTFULLYS1IBMITTED this 4th day of April, 2005. 
c 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
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Hakeem Ishola, #5970 U i .^. 03 
Ishola Law Firm, P.C. Q5&!PR"& 
Attorneys for Defendant
 r , &u oiSt^T 
716 East 4500 South, Suite N-142 t f ^ p J t c a ' H U 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 3 *" ,~^r 
Telephone: (801) 269-9541 B Y ~ " ~ U t ^ * '• U i U I 
Facsimile: (801) 269-9581 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPT., 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VIDAR KILICER, 
Defendant. 
EMERGENCY MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS/ 
WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS 
Case No. 041904765 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(b), Defendant, by and through counsel, 
Hakeem Ishola, hereby moves this court for permission to withdraw the guilty pleas 
entered on or about November 19, 2004.! As demonstrated in the attached memorandum 
of law, good cause exists to allow defendant to withdraw the guilty plea because he was 
misinformed of the immigration consequences of entering the plea. See State v. Rojas-
1
 This case crystalizes the dilemma of a criminal defendant attempting to withdraw a 
guilty plea, but who was unaware of counsel's ineffectiveness prior to sentencing and entering of 
judgment. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(b) (requiring the movant to file a motion to 
withdraw within 30 days of entering plea), with Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (granting right to appeal 30 
days from judgment). 
1 
Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203, _ P.3d _ . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of April, 2005. 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing EMERGENCY 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA/WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS, postage prepaid, this 
6th day of April, 2005, to the following: 
Clark A. Harms 
Deputy District Attorney 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841; 
0\Q 
Addendum C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard F. Norris, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030817-CA 
F I L E D 
[December 2, 2004; 
2004 UT App 452 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Robin W. Reese 
Attorneys: Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Richard F. Norris appeals his conviction of 
attempted communications fraud. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 
to 76-10-1801 (1997). We affirm. 
In December 1994, West Valley City (West Valley) charged 
Defendant with four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud 
in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department.-^- See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1994). In February 1996, the circuit 
court dismissed the misdemeanor charges, ruling that the 
aggregate of the four misdemeanor counts exceeded the circuit 
court's jurisdictional limit of $1000.00. West Valley appealed 
the circuit court's decision. 
On December 10, 1996, because the State was prepared to file 
felony counts of communications fraud against Defendant in 
district court, West Valley moved this court to dismiss its 
appeal. On March 26, 1997, this court dismissed the appeal, and 
on May 13, 1997, this court issued a remittitur. Two days later, 
the State filed twenty felony charges of communications fraud 
against Defendant in district court. 
Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the ground that 
it had been issued prematurely because Defendant's time to file 
a petition for certiorari had not expired. On June 26, 1997, the 
Utah Supreme Court ordered this court to recall the remittitur, 
which this court did on June 30, 1997. On September 26, 1997, 
Defendant moved the district court to dismiss the felony charges 
because the West Valley case was still active. The district 
court did not dismiss the charges, but rather stayed its 
proceedings until all activity in the West Valley appeal had 
ceased. 
After Defendant's petitions for certiorari had been denied 
in both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court, this court reissued the remittitur on October 30, 1998. 
Defendant then moved the district court to dismiss the felony 
charges, claiming that (i) the communications fraud statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and (ii) the district 
court lacked jurisdiction over the May 1997 felony charges 
because the May 1997 remittitur was subsequently recalled. The 
district court denied the motions. 
Defendant then entered a conditional plea in which Defendant 
preserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute and the jurisdiction of the 
district court to hear the felony charges filed in May 1997. 
Defendant appeals these two issues. 
Defendant argues that the statute under which he was charged 
is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. However, after this 
appeal was filed, this court addressed these specific 
challenges. See State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,118-16, 97 P.3d 
732 (holding that the communications fraud statute is neither 
unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague). 
Thus, Defendant's constitutional challenges to the 
communications fraud statute fail.-^-
Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to hear the felony charges filed in May 1997. 
Specifically, Defendant argues that even though this court had 
issued a remittitur in the West Valley appeal before the felony 
charges were filed, the remittitur had no effect because it was 
subsequently recalled. We disagree. 
"The determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, according no deference to the district court's 
determination." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,18, 31 
P. 3d 1147. The issue in this case is whether a valid order 
dismissing the misdemeanor charges in the West Valley case 
existed at the time felony charges were filed. The parties focus 
their arguments on Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assfn. v. 
Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), which held that 
actions taken by a trial court after a remittitur issues are 
void if the remittitur is subsequently recalled. See id. at 307. 
Hi-Country, however, does not control the outcome of this case. 
The controlling case is Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal 
Funding Corp. , 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109.-^- In Chase Manhattan, the 
court outlined the situations in which judgments by appellate 
courts are self-executing. See id. at 111. The court concluded 
that, under the 1997 version of rule 36 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, where "the trial court need not act for a 
valid order to be found in the record," the judgment is self-
executing unless a party specifically requests and is granted a 
stay of the remittitur before it issues.-^- Id. at 112. 
Specifically, the court held that if a judgment by this court is 
self-executing, then a valid order exists on the record from the 
moment the remittitur is issued until it is subsequently 
recalled. See id. at 17. 
In the West Valley appeal, acting on a motion by the 
appellant, this court dismissed the appeal. Dismissal of the 
West Valley appeal required no further action by the circuit 
court, but rather left in place the circuit courtTs ruling that 
dismissed the misdemeanor charges without prejudice. Thus, when 
the State filed felony charges in district court two days after 
this court issued a remittitur, no further action was required 
in the West Valley case. Therefore, a valid judgment existed on 
the record when felony charges were filed. The subsequent recall 
of the remittitur on Defendant's motion did not change this 
fact. See id. at 5112-13. For this reason, the district court 
did not lack jurisdiction when charges were filed in this case. 
1^- Therefore, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Circuit courts merged into district courts on July 1, 1996. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-2 (1997). 
2. Defendant attempts to raise numerous other issues in his 
briefs. We do not address these issues because they exceed the 
scope of what was preserved in the conditional plea. Defendant 
mentions plain error in a single paragraph, but fails to apply 
plain error doctrine to any of the specific issues raised. Thus, 
we do not address Defendant's plain error argument because it is 
inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The 
brief of the appellant shall contain . . . a statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the 
trial court."). 
3. Defendant claims that our prior decision did not directly 
deal with the phrase "anything of value," and thus we are free 
to hold that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on that 
basis. However, our prior decision did hold that "because 
Defendant was charged with devising a scheme to defraud others 
of money, his actions do not fall within the anything of value 
realm, and thus, he may not challenge this phrase as 
unconstitutionally vague." State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,1115, 
97 P.3d 732 (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, 
Defendant also was charged with devising a scheme to defraud 
others of money, and thus under the rule articulated in Norris, 
Defendant also may not challenge this phrase as 
unconstitutionally vague in this case. See id. 
In addition, Defendant's challenge to the State charging 
multiple counts when one communication reaches numerous victims 
already has been decided by this court. See State v. Bradshaw, 
2004 UT App 298, 99 P.3d 359. 
4. The State cites Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 
(1937), a civil case, for the proposition that a second-filed 
action should be stayed until the first-filed action has been 
resolved. See id. at 368. Because that case did not involve a 
remittitur, or even an appeal, it does not speak directly to the 
jurisdictional issue in this case. Rather, it merely indicates 
that in this case it was proper for the district court to issue 
a stay once it was aware that the appeal had been resuscitated. 
5. The current rule avoids the odd situation in this case by 
providing that a remittitur issues immediately after the time 
for filing a petition for certiorari has expired, unless such a 
petition is filed, in which case the remittitur is automatically 
stayed. See Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2). 
6. Defendant claims that his due process rights were violated 
when the State vindictively prosecuted the felony case against 
him, and thus under Blackledqe v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the 
due process violations strip the district court of jurisdiction. 
However, unlike in Blackledqe, the record in this case does not 
indicate a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness,f" id. at 
27, because (i) the original trial court dismissed the 
misdemeanor charges sua sponte, (ii) the appeal was taken by 
West Valley, not the Defendant, (iii) the State indicated its 
intention to file felony charges prior to Defendant asking the 
Utah Supreme Court to recall the appeal, and (iv) the State had 
a legitimate reason to file felony charges when it did, namely 
concern over the statute of limitations. While the Statefs 
actions in this case were less than ideal, the record does not 
come close to establishing prosecutorial vindictiveness in 
response to Defendant exercising his procedural rights on 
appeal. 
Addendum D 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PABLO ANTONIO NUNEZ-ROQUE vs. STATE OF UTAH 
CASE NUMBER 030900080 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
WILLIAM W BARRETT 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - PABLO ANTONIO NUNEZ-ROQUE 
Represented by: ROBERT J BARRON 
Defendant STATE OF UTAH 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT -
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
TAPE 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
140.00 
140.00 
0.00 
0.00 
COPY 
15.00 
15.00 
0.00 
0.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
01-03-03 Filed: Complaint 
01-03-03 Judge HANSON assigned. 
01-03-03 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
01-03-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 140.00 
01-03-03 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 140.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
01-23-03 Filed order: M/E Ruling - Pursuant to Rule 65C(f) it appears 
that this matter should be referred to Judge Frederick as the 
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sentencing judge. Based on the foregoing, the matter is 
referred to Judge Frederick for review & disposition. 
Judge thanson 
Signed January 23, 2003 
01-23-03 Note: *Judge Frederick refers the case to Judge Barrett as the 
judge who took the plea.* 
01-23-03 Judge FREDERICK assigned. 
02-19-03 Tracking started for Other. Review date Apr 01, 2003. 
03-06-03 Minute Entry - RESPONSE ORDER 
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Clerk: nancyw 
AG!s office has 30 days to respond to the petition for relief under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
Judge WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
03-06-03 Note: response order with copy of file place in AG's basket 
03-06-03 Tracking started for Clerk extension. Review date Apr 06, 
2003. 
03-27-03 Judge BARRETT assigned. 
03-27-03 Tracking ended for Other. cindyb 
04-03-03 Filed: Motion for enlargement of time 
04-03-03 Filed: order enlarging time for response 
04-08-03 Filed order: order enlaring time for response 
Judge wbarrett 
Signed April 07, 2003 
05-08-03 Tracking ended for Clerk extension. nancyw 
05-13-03 Filed: Motion to dismiss or for summary judgment 
05-13-03 Filed: memorandum in support of motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment 
06-11-03 Note: Attorney Robber Barron Called requesting an enlargment of 
time due to being actavated in the military 
06-12-03 Filed: Motion for enlargement of time 
C6-13-03 Filed order: order enlarging time for response 
Judge wbarrett 
Signed June 13, 2003 
07-15-03 Filed: response to memorandum in support of motion to dismiss 
opr for summary judgment 
08-06-03 Filed: Notice to Submit for decision 
08-06-03 Filed: State's Reply memorandum in support of it's Motion to 
Dismiss or for summary judgement 
09-11-03 Filed: Ruling On Respondents Motion to Dismiss or For Summary 
Judgement 
10-24-03 Filed: Motion for continuance 
10-29-03 EVIDENTUARY HEARING scheduled on December 04, 2003 at 09:00 AM 
in Third Floor - W35 with Judge BARRETT. 
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10-29-03 Note: Notified Mr. Barron and Mr. Ballard on evidentuary 
continuance and new date and time by telephone. 
12-02-03 Filed: Motion for Continuance by Robert J. Barron Attorney for 
Petitioner 
12-02-03 Filed order: order for continuance 
Judge wbarrett 
Signed December 02, 2003 
12-02-03 EVIDENTUARY HEARING rescheduled on January 14, 2004 at 01:30 PM 
Reason: ATP requested continuance. 
12-02-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030900080 ID 5795987 
EVIDENTUARY HEARING. 
Date: 01/14/2004 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
The reason for the change is ATP requested continuance 
01-09-04 Filed: witness list 
01-09-04 Filed: Motion and order for telephonic testimony 
01-12-04 Filed: exhibit list 
01-14-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for EVIDENTUARY HEARING 
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Clerk: nancyw 
PRESENT 
Plaintifffs Attorney(s): ROBERT J BARRON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHRISTOPHER BALLARD 
Video 
Tape Number: 4 Tape Count: 1:43 
HEARING 
TAPE: 4 COUNT: 1:43 
Petitioner opening statement 
Court address telephone conference due to petitioner being out of 
the country 
COUNT: 1:45 
Respondent exhibit 1 (video tape) offered and received 
PETITIONERS WITNESSES 
COUNT: 1:50 
Ms. Gomez sworn and examined 
COUNT: 1:54 
Ms. Gomez cross examined 
COUNT: 1:56 
Mr. Nunez-Roque called on telephone in courtroom 
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COUNT: 2:02 
Ms. Gomez verified Mr. Nunez-Roque was on the telephone 
COUNT: 2:03 
Mr. Nunez-Roque sworn and examined 
COUNT: 2:10 
Mr.Nunez-Roque waives attorney/client privledge 
COUNT: 2:11 
Mr. Nunez-Roque cross examined 
COUNT: 2:24 
Mr. Nunez-Roque re-direct 
Petitioner rests 
COUNT: 2:26 
RESPONDENTS WITNESS 
Jorge Galvez sworn and examined 
COUNT: 2:39 
Jorge Galvez cross examined 
COUNT: 2:41 
Respondent exhibit 1 (video tape) shown - entering plea 
COUNT: 2:49 
Petitioner exhibit 1 (INS Paperwork) offered and received 
COUNT: 2:56 
Petitioner exhibit 4 (plea agreement) offered and received 
Petitioner exhibit 2 ( INS statute) offered and received 
COUNT: 3:00 
Sentencing of Mr. Nunez-Roque shown on vide tape 
COUNT: 3:12 
OSC of Mr. Nunez-Roque shown on tape 
COUNT: 3:22 
Petitioner exhibit 5 (statute) offered and received 
COUNT: 3:25 
Mr. Galvarez re-direct 
COUNT: 3:29 
respondent rests 
Petitioner closing remarks 
COUNT: 3:32 
respondent's closing remarks 
COUNT: 3:40 
Court addresses deportation and imigration issues 
COUNT: 3:45 
Both parties to supplemental issues in briefing 
Mr. Barron to file by 03-05-04 at 5:00 pm and Mr. Ballard to file 
response by 04-16-04 by 5:00 pm 
01-14-04 Tracking started for Other. Review date Apr 16, 2004. 
01-21-04 Tracking started for Exhibit. Review date May 20, 2004 
01-27-04 Filed: subpoena - not served to Jorge H. Galvez 
02-23-04 Filed: Motion for Enlargement of Time 
02-24-04 Filed order: order enlarging time for response 
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Judge wbarrett 
Signed February 23, 2004 
03-30-04 Filed: second motion for enlargement of time 
03-30-04 Filed order: order enlarging time for response 
Judge wbarrett 
Signed March 30, 2004 
04-14-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
04-14-04 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
04-23-04 Tracking ended for Other. mauriem 
05-03-04 Filed: Third Motion for Enlargment of Time 
05-26-04 Tracking - Exhibit, changed to Review date Aug 20, 2004. jamess 
06-04-04 Filed: petitioner supplemental memorandum of points of 
authorities in support of petition to vacate guilty plea 
(ineffective assistance of counsel) 
07-12-04 Filed: States reply to petitioner's supplemental memorandum 
07-12-04 Filed: states proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and order denying petition for post- conviction relief 
07-13-04 Filed: State's Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and 
Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
07-13-04 Filed: State's Reply to Petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum 
08-23-04 Tracking - Exhibit, changed to Review date Dec 23, 2004. jamess 
09-27-04 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Clerk: nancyw 
On January 14, 2004 a hearing was held on Petitioner's Petition For 
Relief Under the Post Conviction Rememdies Act. I have carefully 
reviewed the testimony and evidence presented during the hearing. 
Further, I have read the memoranda filed by the parties. I also 
note that in considering the testimony of the petitioner and the 
incosistencies it contained I find that his testimony lacked 
credibility. Based upon the above I hereby adopt the State's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to the 
court on July 13, 2004. Respondent's counsel shall prepare the 
findings and conclusions as submitted. 
09-29-04 Filed: findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying 
petition for post-conviction relief 
10-12-04 Filed order: findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order 
denying petition for post-conviction relief 
Judge wbarrett 
Signed October 12, 2004 
12-30-04 Tracking ended for Exhibit. jamess 
01-04-05 Case Disposition is Denied nancyw 
Disposition Judge is WILLIAM W BARRETT nancyw 
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Addendum E 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARIS ALANIS vs. STATE OF UTAH 
CASE NUMBER 040915920 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROBERT K HILDER 
PARTIES 
Petitioner - PARIS ALANIS 
Represented by: DAVID B SHAPIRO 
Respondent - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: CHRISTOPHER D BALLARD 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
07-30-04 Filed: Affidavit of Paris Alanis 
07-30-04 Filed: Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
07-30-04 Judge FRATTO assigned. 
07-30-04 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
07-30-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
07-30-04 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
158.00 
158.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.00 
3.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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07-30-04 Filed: Complaint 
08-02-04 Note: File referred to Judge Fratto 
08-03-04 Filed order: Order Requiring Respondent's Pleading 
Judge jfratto 
Signed August 03, 2004 
09-07-04 Filed: Motion to Dismiss 
09-07-04 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
10-07-04 Filed: Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
and Request for Hearing 
10-18-04 Filed: Minute Entry (matter referred to sentencing judge, Judge 
Robert Hilder) 
10-18-04 Judge HILDER assigned. 
10-29-04 MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on December 01, 2004 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER. 
10-29-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 040915920 ID 6100316 
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 12/01/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
11-30-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 040915920 ID 6127797 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Date: 12/15/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
The reason for the change is Court Ordered 
Plaintiff is in Federal Custody and currently in Weber County Jail. 
Mr. Shapiro to prepare writ to have Plaintiff transported. 
11-30-04 MOTION TO DISMISS rescheduled on December 15, 2004 at 09:00 AM 
Reason: Court Ordered. 
12-02-04 Filed: Application For Writ Of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum 
And Order 
12-15-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 040915920 ID 6141745 
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 12/17/2004 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBERT K HILDER 
12-15-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO DISMISS 
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Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Clerk: lindav 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: DAVID SHAPIRO 
Attorney for the Respondent: CHRISTOPHER BALLARD 
Video 
Tape Count: Off Record 
HEARING 
Deft was not transported from Weber County Jail for today's 
hearing. Court reschedules to Friday, Dec, 17, 2004 at 9:30 am. 
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 12/17/2004 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBERT K HILDER 
12-15-04 MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on December 17, 2004 at 09:30 AM in 
Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER. 
12-15-04 Filed order: Transportation Order 
Judge rhilder 
Signed December 15, 2004 
12-15-04 Filed order: Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad 
Testificandum and Order (Amended by Judge Hilder) 
Judge rhilder 
Signed December 15, 2004 
12-16-04 Note: Anita Church from SL Co Sheriff today. She states that 
deft is being airlifted to Federal Prison and will not be 
transported to court for hearing. 
12-17-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Clerk: markp 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: DAVID SHAPIRO 
Attorney for the Respondent: CHRISTOPHER BALLARD 
Video 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9:50 
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Court finds that the plantiff needs to be present in some form in 
order for the facts to be heard. Mr. Shapiro is to set up a 
telephone conference as soon as the plaintiff is located and it can 
be arranged. The motion is still pending. 
02-23-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 040915920 ID 6203799 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING/2 HOURS is scheduled. 
Date: 04/12/2005 
Time: 03:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Deft to be present at this hearing by telephone. Mr. Shapiro to 
make arrangments with Federal authorities and provide telephone 
number to court. 
02-23-05 EVIDENTIARY HEARING/2 HOURS scheduled on April 12, 2005 at 
03:00 PM in Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER. 
04-12-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Clerk: lindav 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: DAVID B SHAPIRO 
Petitioner(s): PARIS ALANIS 
Attorney for the Respondent: CHRISTOPHER D BALLARD 
Respondent(s): STATE OF UTAH 
Video 
Tape Count: 3:00 
HEARING 
COUNT: 3:00 
Paris Alanis sworn and testified. Patricia Alanis sworn and 
testified. Jose Luis Trujillo sworn and testified. Closing 
arguments Court ordered State's motion to dismiss granted. ] 
Ballard to prepare order. 
04-12-05 Case Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition Judge is ROBERT K HILDER 
06-01-05 Note: ****RECD: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Dismissing Petition With Prejudice**** 
06-02-05 Filed order: Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order 
Dismissing Petition With Prejudice 
Judge rhilder 
Signed June 02, 2005 
06-03-05 Filed: Certifcate Of Service 
lindav 
lindav 
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06-14-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.00 
06-14-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 3.00 
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Addendum F 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUMBERTO ANDRADE vs. STATE OF UTAH 
CASE NUMBER 050903219 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
W BRENT WEST 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - HUMBERTO ANDRADE 
OGDEN, UT 84401 
Represented by: RICK S LUNDELL 
Defendant - STATE OF UTAH 
SLC, UT 84114 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT • 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
S 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
05-26-05 Judge LYON assigned. 
05-26-05 Judge WEST assigned. 
05-26-05 Filed: Complaint 
05-26-05 Filed: Verified Petition For Relief Under The Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act 
05-26-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
05-26-05 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
06-23-05 Filed: Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel 
07-11-05 Note: Due to clerk error, this case was not sent up to the 
judge when it was filed. File given to judge on this date. 
07-15-05 Filed: Memorandum Decision 
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08-17-05 Filed: Motion For Enlargement Of Time 
08-19-05 Filed: Memorandum In Opposition To Respondent's Motion For 
Enlargement Of Time 
08-26-05 Filed: Request to Submit For Decision (Motion For Enlargement 
Of Time) 
08-26-05 Filed: Reply In Support Of State's Motion Fo Enlargement Of 
Time 
08-29-05 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Oct 28, 
2005. 
08-29-05 Note: FILE TO WBW 
08-29-05 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME - COURT READ PRIOR TO SIGNING THE ORDER TO 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
08-29-05 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF HUMBERTO HERNANDEZ ANDRADE 
09-01-05 Filed order: Order Enlarging Time for Response 
Judge wwest 
Signed August 28, 2005 
09-13-05 Note: FILE TO WBW 
09-26-05 Note: Copies of Entire file mailed to AG's office. Original 
Criminal File Mailed to AG's office 8/29/05 by WBW's clerk 
Copies of subsequent documents for criminal case mailed to AG's 
office 
09-26-05 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OF COPIES OF THIS FILE, 
SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS FILED IN CRIMINAL FILE 041903329 FS 
09-27-05 Filed: Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
09-29-05 Note: File and Response to Judge W. Brent West for reivew. 
Judge West will forward to Scheduling Clerk to set Evidentiary 
Hearing. 
10-06-05 Filed: Objection To Respondents Request For Evidentiary Hearing 
10-11-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050903219 ID 8691330 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 11/01/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: 2nd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
252 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: W BRENT WEST 
These matters will be discussed: trial dates, discovery completion 
dates, jury or non-jury trial, trial length, dates for dispositive 
motions, dates for exchange of witness lists, nature and complexity 
of case, final pretrial date and settlement status. 
Counsel or parties are requested to be in their respective offices 
at the time set for the telephone conference. The clerk will 
initiate the conference call. 
10-11-05 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on November 01, 2005 at 08:30 AM 
in 2nd Floor Northwest with Judge WEST. 
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10-12-05 Filed: States Response To Petitioners Objection To States 
Request For Evidentiary Hearing 
10-21-05 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
10-21-05 Filed order: DECISION - STATE'S MOTION FOR AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING IS GRANTED. DECISION MAILED TO PARTIES 
Judge wwest 
Signed October 13, 2005 
11-01-05 HEARING scheduled on November 08, 2005 at 01:00 PM in 2nd Floor 
Northwest with Judge WEST. 
11-01-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Judge: W BRENT WEST 
Clerk: pama 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRIAN LOFGREN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHRISTOPHER BALLARD 
Video 
Tape Number: OFF RECORD 
HEARING 
This is the time set for pre trial conference. The conference is 
held by telephone. Post Conviction Hearing set for 11-8-05 at 1:00 
pm. 
Interpreter needed for the hearing. Respondent to appear by 
telephone. 
HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 11/08/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: 2nd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: W BRENT WEST 
POST CONVICTION HEARING. 
Date: 11/08/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: 2nd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
before Judge W BRENT WEST 
11-01-05 HEARING Cancelled. 
Reason: Case continued 
11-01-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050903219 ID 8706418 
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POST CONVICTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 
Date: 11/08/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: 2nd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
before Judge W BRENT WEST 
11-01-05 POST CONVICTION HEARING scheduled on November 08, 2005 at 01:00 
PM in 2nd Floor Northwest with Judge WEST. 
11-03-05 Note: Received Order Granting Request For Evidentiary Hearing 
11-04-05 Note: ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO WBW 
11-08-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for POST CONVICTION HEARING 
Judge: W BRENT WEST 
Clerk: pama 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): HUMBERTO ANDRADE 
Plaintifffs Attorney(s): BRIAN LUNDELL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHRIS BALLARD 
Video 
Tape Number: Wll-08-05 Tape Count: 1:07 
HEARING 
This is the time set for post conviction hearing. Attorney Brian 
Lundell is present representing the plaintiff, Humberto Andrade, 
who is present by telephone. 
The Clerk swears in Jaime Hernandez as a Spanish interpretor who 
is present with Mr. Andrade. Interpreter Luther Gaylord is present 
in the court room translating for the plaintiffs wife, Maria 
Lourdes Uribe. 
Christopher Ballard is present representing the State of Utah. 
State calls Attorney Chad McKay, witness is sworn and testifies. 
State rests. 
Attorney Lundell calls the plaintiff, Humberto Andrade, who is 
sworn and testifies by phone. Witness is cross examined. 
Attorney Lundell next calls Maria Lourdes Uribe, the plaintiff's 
wife. Witness is sworn and testifies. 
Witness Chad McKay is recalled and testifies. 
Argument. 
Court takes this case underadvisement and will render a decision. 
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